
Ukraine's fiscal stability beyond 2027 hinges on EU funding and IMF reviews. Reconstruction will need private capital, Jaresko said.
Ukraine faces sharp fiscal trade-offs even with large-scale external support, according to a Peterson Institute for International Economics discussion featuring senior fellow Nicolas Véron and former finance minister Natalie Jaresko. The current mix of foreign grants and concessional loans, combined with domestic revenue, has kept the economy running through more than two years of war. The equation after 2027 is unsettled.
European Union funding arrangements expire that year. How much additional support the EU and other donors will commit beyond that point remains an open question. The IMF approved a $15.6 billion extended fund facility in 2023. Véron said IMF conditionality has anchored policy discipline. He noted that the program's design must adapt as the war evolves.
Domestic revenue is the second variable. Tax receipts have held up better than many expected, helped by a shift to a wartime tax regime and a still-functioning banking sector. Jaresko said the banking system has remained stable since the initial shock of 2022, with deposits returning and lending gradually restarting. State-owned banks that dominate the sector still need capital buffers. Raising tax revenue further without crushing private activity is difficult when a large share of the economy is either destroyed or operating under occupation.
Monetary stability has been maintained through capital controls and a managed hryvnia. A deep domestic bond market absorbs excess liquidity. The central bank has rebuilt reserves to roughly $40 billion, a level that provides a cushion against renewed pressure. Inflation has moderated. It remains above target. Getting it lower would require even tighter policy, which would slow an already fragile recovery of private demand.
The ceasefire question complicates every projection. A pause in fighting would reduce immediate defense spending, currently about a quarter of GDP. It would not erase the need for ongoing military outlays or the cost of rebuilding destroyed infrastructure. Reconstruction alone will require hundreds of billions of dollars, Jaresko said. Private capital, including foreign direct investment and insurance-linked instruments, will have to shoulder a large share of that bill. Official development assistance cannot cover it.
Véron pointed out that reconstruction works best when the future of the country's sovereignty is clear. That uncertainty is inherent in any frozen conflict. Investors will need credible war-risk insurance and transparent procurement before they commit large sums. Ukraine has made progress on anti-corruption enforcement, he said. None of these fronts is fully resolved.
The IMF program includes structural benchmarks on governance and energy sector reform. Meeting those targets is a prerequisite for the next disbursement. Missed benchmarks have caused delays before. The risk of further slippage is real. Kyiv has a strong incentive to comply because the alternative, losing access to official financing, would force deeper cuts or faster money printing. Neither is politically viable.
Jaresko said the size of the reconstruction needs means Ukraine will have to develop new financing channels, possibly including state-backed development banks or multilateral guarantee schemes that can absorb first-loss risk. The private sector will not step in without those layers of protection.
The IMF's fourth review is scheduled for later this year.
Prepared with AlphaScala editorial tooling from the source reporting linked above. Indexable analysis may include a cited Alpha Score value. Publishing checks screen each story before release. Educational coverage, not personalized advice.