Near One Warns Quantum Attacks Could Trigger Ownership Crisis

The threat of quantum computing to blockchain security has historically been framed as a binary: either the encryption holds, or the network collapses. However, the research team behind NEAR Protocol, operating under the Near One banner, is shifting the focus toward a more complex post-breach reality. According to Near One’s chief technology officer, Anton Astafiev, the primary danger is not just the potential for unauthorized access, but the subsequent inability of decentralized networks to verify the legitimacy of asset ownership once a system is compromised.

In a traditional financial system, a central authority can intervene to reverse fraudulent transactions or freeze accounts based on legal identity. Blockchain networks, by design, rely on cryptographic signatures to prove ownership. If a quantum computer becomes capable of forging these signatures, the fundamental link between a private key and an asset is severed. Astafiev noted that in such a scenario, networks may struggle to distinguish between the rightful owner and an attacker, stating, “We won’t be able to tell if someone running a transaction is the rightful owner of the asset or not.”

This ambiguity creates a significant operational risk for decentralized protocols. If an attacker successfully uses quantum-enabled tools to move funds, the network faces a choice between two equally damaging outcomes. It can either allow the theft to proceed, effectively legitimizing the attacker’s control, or it can attempt to block the compromised assets. The latter option risks creating a chaotic environment where funds are frozen arbitrarily, potentially leading to a “wild west” scenario where the immutability of the ledger is sacrificed to mitigate systemic theft.

To address this, Near One is advocating for the integration of zero-knowledge proof technology. This method would allow users to cryptographically prove they possess the original seed phrase associated with a wallet without actually revealing the private key itself. By decoupling the proof of ownership from the signature that authorizes a transaction, protocols could theoretically verify the identity of the user even if the underlying signature scheme is under threat. This adds a layer of resilience that goes beyond simple encryption, focusing instead on the verification of intent and history.

Technological migration is already underway as the industry prepares for a post-quantum future. Near One is actively developing a post-quantum-safe signing system for the NEAR protocol, with plans to implement FIPS-204. This lattice-based digital signature standard, recently approved by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology, is designed to withstand the computational power of large-scale quantum machines. The team has targeted the end of the second quarter of 2026 for the rollout of this system on the NEAR testnet.

Other major networks are pursuing similar defensive strategies to ensure long-term viability. The following table outlines the current initiatives across the broader crypto market analysis landscape:

Solana’s validator clients, Anza and Firedancer, have already introduced test versions of Falcon, a signature tool designed to protect validators without introducing significant latency. This is a critical distinction, as security upgrades often come at the cost of network throughput. If a security solution slows a chain to a crawl, it risks losing its utility, which is why developers are prioritizing performance-neutral implementations.

Ethereum is also integrating quantum resistance into its long-term roadmap. Vitalik Buterin has outlined a multi-faceted approach that includes quantum-resistant signatures, updated wallet architectures, and enhanced data availability protocols. These efforts are supported by broader industry warnings, including those from Coinbase’s advisory board and Google Quantum AI. Google researchers have specifically cautioned that future quantum computers may require fewer resources than previously estimated to threaten existing cryptographic standards, suggesting that the timeline for these threats may be shorter than some skeptics assume.

Despite these warnings, it is essential to distinguish between theoretical risk and immediate market impact. Current quantum hardware lacks the scale and stability required to compromise major blockchain networks. The risk is not that a sudden collapse is imminent, but that the window for implementing migration plans is closing. The industry is effectively in a race to upgrade its cryptographic infrastructure before the hardware catches up to the theory.

For developers and validators, the challenge is twofold. First, they must ensure that the transition to post-quantum standards does not create new, unforeseen vulnerabilities. Second, they must establish governance processes that can handle the fallout of a potential breach. If a network cannot prove ownership, the community will be forced to decide whether to intervene in the ledger. This is a political and social challenge as much as a technical one. As the industry moves toward these standards, the focus will likely shift from the raw power of quantum machines to the robustness of the protocols designed to resist them.