
Monthly casualties reach 35,000. Record deficits and elite discontent signal deepening strain inside Russia as the Ukraine war enters its fourth year.
The war in Ukraine has entered its fourth year, and the signals from inside Russia point to a deepening political and economic strain that goes beyond the battlefield. Monthly casualties have reached around 35,000, and total losses exceed the rate of recruitment. The fiscal picture is worsening. Russia is running record government deficits, with the entire year's expected expenditures blown past by nearly 60% within four months. The Finance Ministry has called for slashing non-military spending, which means less funding for the patronage-dependent regions outside Moscow and St. Petersburg.
Those regions already face double-digit inflation, while official statistics mask deeper distortions. Many mono-industrial towns, built around Soviet-era extraction facilities, rely on state subsidies to keep prices low. Sanctions and China's monopsony pricing have squeezed their margins. The real cost of the war, when factoring in support for these state-dependent enterprises, is higher than the commonly cited 8% of GDP.
Western sanctions on oil exports have forced Russia to sell crude at thinner margins. Ukrainian strikes on refineries and storage facilities have led to fuel rationing and imports. On the military side, Ukraine has degraded Russia's air defense and elite drone units, turning the conflict into a bloodier grind for Moscow.
Behind the propaganda, elite discontent is rising. Ilya Remeslo, a longtime pro-Putin activist, was detained in a psychiatric facility after publishing a manifesto calling Putin illegitimate. Remeslo is not alone. Oligarchs and politicians have voiced opposition to the war itself, and talks between Kyiv and Roman Abramovich signal a willingness to engage. The arrest of Ilya Traber, a figure with Kremlin ties, over a murder case has further exposed the cracks in the patronage network.
The Kremlin's decision to ban Telegram, later reversed, drew rare public pushback from politicians. The ban was not directly blamed on Putin but on "incompetent officials" – a sign of how the system deflects blame. Still, the foundational support bases are showing fatigue. A video of a disgruntled soldier threatening an armed revolt over abuse and ill-treatment was acknowledged by the Kremlin.
Russia cannot rely on external allies to shift the tide. North Korea offers limited help. China has every incentive to extract resources at steep discounts, as seen in the delays over Power of Siberia 2. Beijing also profits by selling weapons and components to both sides through third parties.
None of this points to imminent regime change. The risk of cohesion loss is real. Putin has positioned himself as the only viable choice for 28 years, leaving no credible alternative. The competing factions – imperial nationalists, Soviet nostalgists, rent-seeking oligarchs, security service clans – are armed and opposed. If the system fractures, the prospect of political violence is high.
The Finance Ministry's proposed cuts to non-military spending will test the loyalty of regional governors and ethnic republics like Chechnya. If those cuts trigger public unrest, the Kremlin will face a choice between more repression and more spending. The war's trajectory shows no signs of a decisive Russian breakthrough. A senior Russian official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told the source that "the trajectory is unsustainable, no one in the inner circle knows how to change it without losing everything."
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