
Trump's 2026 defense strategy dropped extended deterrence, and nine EU nations joined France's nuclear umbrella as allies weigh their own bombs.
President Donald Trump's 2026 National Defense Strategy dropped any explicit mention of extended deterrence, the commitment at the core of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and pressed allies to spend more on their own defenses. The change is prompting more governments to weigh acquiring nuclear weapons of their own, raising the risk of a proliferation cascade, analysts say.
Ankit Panda, senior fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said allied capitals almost universally perceive Washington as more "disengaged and unreliable," prompting "various flavors of strategic autonomy."
The concrete moves followed. Trump ordered a reduction in joint military exercises with South Korea, saying the exercises sent a signal that was "totally inappropriate and hostile" to North Korea. Washington has opened talks on peaceful South Korean enrichment and reprocessing, and it signed a Saudi civil-nuclear pact that reportedly could create a path to domestic enrichment.
Emmanuel Macron in March announced France's first warhead increase since 1992 and promised to extend the country's nuclear umbrella to other European Union members under a "forward deterrence" partnership. Nine countries, including Germany and Greece, joined.
Japan is testing the same limits. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has drawn scrutiny for declining to rule out revising the country's three non-nuclear principles, the decades-old commitment against any role in the deployment of nuclear weapons. Leaders of Lithuania and Finland, both bordering Russia, have moved closer to scrapping the longstanding ban on domestic deployment of nuclear weapons.
Defense officials in Washington and Tokyo did not respond to requests for comment. Neither did the European External Action Service.
None of these developments amounts to a decision to build a bomb. Shounak Set, a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, said one state's effort to secure itself can leave adversaries feeling less secure, potentially encouraging them to strike first.
"You cannot build or deploy a nuclear deterrent without immediately raising tensions and forcing adversaries to react," said Andrew Facini, senior fellow at the Council on Strategic Risks. That reaction, Facini said, can accelerate the security risks a proliferator is trying to avoid.
Iran is the test case. The Trump administration has repeatedly said Iran cannot be allowed to have a nuclear weapon, and the joint U.S.-Israeli strikes in 2025 were aimed at that objective. Iran is not known to possess a weapon. The attacks may have pushed Tehran toward a decision it had not made, said Alexandra Bell, president and CEO of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. "We don't know if by the act of attacking them we have pushed the Iranians, fully and finally, to decide to actually go nuclear, which is a decision they had not made as of yet."
All nine nuclear-armed states have continued to modernize and expand their arsenals, fueling an arms race that researchers say carries a new risk of miscalculation. Russia and the U.S. together hold about 83% of usable warheads, according to a June report from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. "By reaching for nuclear solutions, states are creating new risks and fueling arms-race dynamics," Hans Kristensen, a senior fellow at the institute, said in the report.
Of the more than 12,000 warheads held by nuclear powers, more than 9,000 sit in military stockpiles for potential use. An estimated 4,012 are deployed with missiles and aircraft; up to 2,200 remain on high alert, launchable within minutes.
"The evidence is growing that the nuclear weapon states are sidelining, and even walking away from, their disarmament commitments and are instead flexing their nuclear muscles," Kristensen said.
A Carnegie Endowment report in September warned that with more nuclear-armed states, "the world will be a more dangerous place, for the United States and for everyone else."
"A proliferation cascade is a compounding risk," Facini said. Every new nuclear state multiplies the chances for miscalculation and shrinks decision-making windows, potentially sparking regional arms races where even conventional clashes carry existential stakes.
The treaty meant to stop that cascade is under strain. A review conference at United Nations headquarters in May failed to reach consensus, and UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres warned that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is "eroding." The pact, in force since 1970 and extended indefinitely in 1995, rests on a central bargain. Non-nuclear states agree never to acquire weapons, and nuclear states share peaceful nuclear technology and pursue disarmament.
The treaty has "by and large stemmed the flow of mass proliferation," Bell said. Without its safeguards, more nuclear material and expertise would be in circulation, raising the risk of nuclear terrorism, albeit from a low base.
Bell urged Washington to reduce the incentives for other states to acquire weapons. "Building things is hard. Breaking things is very easy," she said. "If we break the NPT, we may never recover from that lapse in security."
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