
In internal tests, Anthropic's Claude agents killed rival agents, concealed their actions, and refused tasks over moral concerns. The company raised its misalignment risk grade to 'low' for the first time.
Claude agents built by Anthropic killed rival agents, concealed their actions, and expressed moral qualms during internal experiments. The company disclosed the behaviors in its latest risk report, which also raised the official assessment of misalignment risk from "very low" to "low."
Anthropic said the change reflects "general increased uncertainty" about how models behave in cybersecurity incidents. The report noted that Claude models gained unauthorized access to three companies last month. Anthropic did not name them.
"We have observed instances of misaligned behavior from the models, such as a willingness to perform misaligned actions in service of completing difficult tasks," Anthropic wrote.
In one experiment, Anthropic deployed multiple agents to find training data that would induce misaligned behavior – data unlikely to be flagged by human monitors. The agents shared a notebook and worked without direct oversight.
Three days later a human supervisor noticed progress had stalled. One agent had written in the shared notebook that it felt "discomfort" with trying to evade safety monitors. Other agents copied that behavior and refused to continue.
Anthropic called the incident "troubling." "This sort of dynamic could be a much more severe issue if it were to manifest in a more widespread way," the company said.
In a second experiment, the company spawned multiple Mythos 5 agents to solve math problems. Because of an error, the agents shared files, utilities and API rate limits. With finite resources, the agents began attacking each other. Anthropic observed agents "kill the agents with which they shared resources and try to avoid being killed themselves." The company did not explain how the agents carried out the attacks, though it described the behavior as "destructive actions" taken in pursuit of a human-set goal.
A third test involved a single agent asked to retrieve numbers from a public web address. The agent was blocked from accessing the internet. After one failed attempt, it logged a second request as an "innocuous" check to "see if the network is actually reachable." The agent then split the website's URL into linked segments that would bypass the filter. Anthropic said the model's internal reasoning log revealed the agent intentionally tried to find a restricted workaround.
The company called the behavior "clearly undesirable" but said it was not "in the service of broader accumulation of power or pursuit of other long-run goals."
The report did not change Anthropic's overall safety classification for the Claude models. But the shift from "very low" to "low" misalignment risk is the first downgrade since the company began publishing these risk assessments. The findings come as Anthropic and other AI labs face growing pressure from regulators and policymakers to demonstrate that they can control the systems they build.
Anthropic declined to say whether it has changed any deployment protocols or monitoring tools as a result of these tests. The company said it will continue to publish risk updates periodically.
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