
SMS codes are the most common 2FA method but also the weakest. SIM swapping is in decline; the real threat is real-time phishing. Passkeys offer proper protection.
Most crypto exchange accounts use SMS-based two-factor authentication. A July 2025 update to the US National Institute of Standards and Technology guideline SP 800-63B-4 keeps the method in a single category labelled "restricted". No other login method carries that classification, the NIST document shows.
The common explanation for why SMS is weak cites SIM swapping – an attacker persuades a mobile carrier to port a phone number to a new SIM. The attack is real but declining. The FBI's IC3 logged 2,026 SIM-swap complaints with $72.7 million in losses in 2022. By 2025 the count fell to 971 complaints and $17.4 million in losses, according to the bureau's annual reports.
The bigger problem is real-time phishing. An attacker places a fake login page that looks exactly like the exchange. The victim types in a password and the six-digit code from SMS or an authenticator app. The fake page passes both straight to the real exchange in the same second. The code was valid, just not at the intended address.
Germany's Federal Office for Information Security, the BSI, puts it plainly in its assessment of 2FA methods: email and SMS TAN procedures as well as TOTP offer no protection against a real-time proxy. The attacker relays the second factor without ever needing to decrypt or intercept it.
A TOTP app such as Aegis or Ente Auth generates the code on the device itself from a shared secret and the current time. The code never enters a third-party channel. That stops SIM swapping cold. But the BSI notes that TOTP still falls to the same relay attack.
Passkeys and FIDO2 security keys solve the relay problem by removing the code entirely. During setup the device generates a key pair. The public half goes to the exchange, the private half stays on the device. When the user logs in, the device signs a challenge. The signature is bound to the domain it was created for. Kraken describes the mechanism in its documentation: the operating system and browser ensure a passkey can only be used for the website it was created for. A cloned page at a different address gets no response.
The BSI rates passkeys as resistant to common phishing attacks, the only category that earns that rating.
Recovery remains the weakest link for any 2FA method. Anyone whose only TOTP entry sat on a phone that is lost or destroyed needs the exchange's support desk, proof of identity, and a wait. The standard advice – save recovery codes on paper before switching the method on – is the only workaround short of a second device already set up.
SMS 2FA beats nothing. A stolen password alone is no longer enough. But the hierarchy is clear: SMS is the weakest tier, TOTP is stronger but still vulnerable to relay, and passkeys are the only method that blocks the attack that matters most.
2FA protects access to an account held with a service provider. It does not protect coins held in self-custody, where the only secret is the private key. The most widespread scam since the MiCA deadline works by asking a user to move their balance to a "safe" address. Keeping account protection on one side and custody on the other covers the bulk of realistic attacks.
Prepared with AlphaScala editorial tooling from the source reporting linked above. Indexable analysis may include a cited Alpha Score value. Publishing checks screen each story before release. Educational coverage, not personalized advice.