Drained across Ethereum, Base, and BNB Chain in 10–30 minutes, the attack exposes a key-management failure that threatens all SIGMA-generated wallets.
A crypto trader lost over $200,000 on May 11, 2026, after a Telegram bot named SIGMA allegedly exposed the private keys to wallets it generated. The attacker drained assets across Ethereum (ETH), Base, and BNB Chain (BNB) in an estimated 10 to 30 minutes, turning a single-wallet compromise into a multi-chain liquidity sweep.
The speed and cross-chain execution make the incident a direct warning for anyone using convenience tools that handle private keys on the server side. SIGMA operated as a Telegram-based interface for creating and managing wallets, a model that trades away the security guarantees of locally generated keys. The alleged key exposure implies that private key material was either logged, stored in plaintext, or transmitted through a channel an outsider could intercept. Once an attacker holds the keys, there is no smart-contract barrier to drain funds. The only remaining defense is the time it takes to broadcast a transaction and the alertness of the victim–both were bypassed in this case.
Telegram bots that generate wallets often handle key creation within a server-side script or pass them through the chat environment. Either method creates a recording surface. The SIGMA incident highlights a breakdown at that precise layer. The attacker did not need to execute a phishing campaign or exploit a browser extension. Access to the raw private keys was sufficient to sign and authorize transfers across multiple networks.
This is a pure key-management failure, distinct from the smart-contract exploits that grab headlines. No reentrancy bug, no flawed oracle, no governance attack. The loss traces back to how the keys were created and stored. For traders who used SIGMA to manage positions on multiple chains, the risk is immediate: any wallet generated by the bot before the exposure was discovered may still contain assets that are accessible to the attacker if the keys were exfiltrated and kept.
The attacker moved funds on Ethereum, Base, and BNB Chain within the same tight window. That speed points to pre-planned scripted sweeps that detect balances and route them to controlled addresses the moment a key is loaded. Ethereum mainnet, Base, and BSC host a wide range of DeFi liquidity pools, and a drain spanning all three chains compresses the window for any response. Manual intervention, blacklisting, or communication with exchange compliance teams becomes nearly impossible.
On-chain analysts can trace the movements, and centralized exchanges can freeze flagged addresses. The velocity of the attack, however, reduces those chances. The attacker likely used decentralized exchanges or cross-chain bridges immediately to swap tokens into ETH or stablecoins and disperse the proceeds further. The tactic echoes the pattern observed in a broader DeFi exploit wave where speed and automation amplify the damage from a single point of failure.
The direct financial loss exceeds $200,000, a sum that can wipe out a serious individual trader. The systemic risk is larger: a cascade of withdrawals from other SIGMA-generated wallets once users realize their keys may be compromised. If the bot maintained a non-trivial user base, a sudden rush of exit transactions could congest the chains where those wallets are active. Lower-liquidity pairs on Base and BSC would see spreads widen and order books thin, punishing late movers with extra slippage.
The incident also raises the trust cost for every Telegram-based crypto tool. Developers of similar bots now face pressure to demonstrate that key material is generated exclusively client-side and that zero logs are retained. Failure to provide that proof will accelerate a migration to established wallet infrastructure, shifting liquidity patterns in the process. For protocols that depend on bot-driven retail flows, a sudden exit translates into measurable protocol-level liquidity gaps.
The next concrete marker is whether additional SIGMA-generated wallets show signs of compromise in the days following May 11. A second wave of thefts would confirm that the key leak was not a single-instance exposure, exposing the entire user base. Any trader who generated a wallet through the bot should assume the keys are burned and move remaining funds to a new, securely created wallet immediately. The event also sets a test for Telegram’s crypto ecosystem: if bot developers cannot deliver verifiable key security under the pressure of this incident, the convenience premium that drove adoption will disappear fast.
Drafted by the AlphaScala research model and grounded in primary market data – live prices, fundamentals, SEC filings, hedge-fund holdings, and insider activity. Each story is checked against AlphaScala publishing rules before release. Educational coverage, not personalized advice.