
MEV costs users 0.4% on swaps and borrowers 7.5% on liquidations. Private mempools and intents offer fixes. Here's how it works.
Transaction ordering costs DeFi users billions each year. The mechanism behind it, Maximal Extractable Value (MEV), extracts value through worse prices and liquidation losses, a detailed guide from Crypto Daily says. A 10,000 USDC market buy on a mid-cap token can cost 0.4% more in slippage, or about 40 dollars, when a sandwich attack brackets the trade. A liquidation of a 20,000 dollar position triggers a 7.5% bonus, or 1,500 dollars, extracted by the searcher who wins the race.
The sandwich attack is the most common MEV tactic. A searcher sees a pending swap in the public mempool, buys the token ahead of the user to push the price up, then sells after the user's trade executes at the inflated price. The user gets fewer tokens than the quote. The bot locks in the spread.
Liquidation is another big source of MEV. When a collateralized loan falls below the threshold, the first searcher to submit the liquidation earns the bonus. The borrower pays that bonus. The race is largely private, run through bundles sent directly to block builders, so the borrower cannot see it or front-run it.
Arbitrage also falls under MEV. Bots keep prices aligned across pools. The user's market order often creates the mispricing the bot fixes. The profit from that fix goes to the bot, the block builder, and the validator, not back to the user.
On Ethereum after the Merge, most blocks are built by specialized builders rather than the proposing validator. The coordination layer is MEV-Boost, an open-source sidecar that lets validators source blocks from builders without trusting them. Builders compete to assemble the most valuable block, often by including private bundles from searchers. That improves validator revenue. Transaction ordering becomes a market where the user's trade is the raw material.
L2s handle ordering differently. A central sequencer can prevent public sandwiching. It can also internalize arbitrage. Solana uses local fee markets and priority fees, with Jito Labs operating relays and auctions tailored to that chain. The core principle holds: whoever controls the order can capture value.
Users and borrowers pay through worse prices and liquidation bonuses. Liquidity providers pay by trading against better-informed flow, often realizing losses versus rebalancing. Searchers capture opportunities, while builders and relays take a cut. Validators or sequencers see higher returns for selling block space.
Not all MEV is pure rent extraction. Liquidations protect lenders. Arbitrage keeps prices aligned. The open question is how to share the surplus fairly and block the predatory parts, such as classic sandwiches on retail-sized trades.
Designs that could shift the balance include intents-based systems like UniswapX and CoW Protocol, which use Dutch auctions and batch auctions to reduce sandwich risk. Private mempools and order flow auctions let wallets and aggregators sell the right to fill user trades to a set of solvers, ideally sharing some of the surplus back.
Private routing helps by hiding the order from the public mempool. It does not guarantee inclusion or best price. If a private path cannot fill, the trade may fall back to the public mempool, exposing the user again. Wallets that handle retries differently can leave users vulnerable.
The Ethereum community is discussing enshrined proposer-builder separation, with core developer notes available on Ethereum.org. The next network upgrade will determine how the ordering market changes.
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