Antimony Processing Deficit Hits 27% by 2030 as China Controls Supply

By 2030, antimony smelters outside China are projected to meet only about 73% of demand outside China, according to industry data. That leaves a processing shortfall of roughly 25,000 tonnes, or about 27% of projected demand. The figure assumes every announced project gets built. It is the optimistic case.

Antimony hardens ammunition, ignites primers, and goes into flame retardants, night-vision gear, and solar glass. The United States imported an estimated 91% of its supply in 2025 while producing essentially none domestically. China and Russia together control about four-fifths of global mine supply and processing capacity. When a supply chain is that concentrated in the hands of strategic rivals, every credible domestic source becomes strategically valuable.

The problem is actually two problems stacked on top of each other. The first is a shortage of mines outside China and Russia. The second is a shortage of processing capacity, the smelting and refining that turns ore into usable metal. Even where the West can dig antimony out of the ground, it largely cannot process it at scale. Industry analysis identifies only three proposed antimony smelters outside China and Russia: one in Oman and two in the United States. Even if all three are completed, total capacity outside China and Russia would reach only about 68,000 tonnes by 2030, against projected demand outside China of roughly 93,000 tonnes. That is a deficit of about 27%.

China turned the supply chain into a weapon in 2024. In August of that year, Beijing introduced export controls on antimony products, citing national security. By December, it had prohibited exports of controlled antimony items to the United States outright. The price response was violent: the antimony reference price in Northwest Europe rose from roughly $23 per kilogram in August 2024 to around $63 per kilogram by mid-2025, according to industry data. China temporarily suspended the U.S.-specific prohibition in November 2025, which helped pull prices back toward the mid-$20s per kilogram through 2026. The reprieve is neither complete nor guaranteed. The suspension is set to expire on November 27, 2026. The underlying export-licensing system remains firmly in place. The prohibition on exports to U.S. military users or for military end use was never lifted. The single most important consumer of antimony for national-security purposes, the U.S. defense complex, still cannot rely on the dominant global supplier.

That military demand is rising sharply. U.S. production of 155mm artillery rounds climbed from roughly 14,000 a month in 2022 to about 36,000 a month by early 2026. NATO has reported that Europe's artillery-ammunition capacity increased several-fold in two years. Global military expenditure reached a record of around $2.9 trillion in 2025. In March 2026, the U.S. Department of War awarded $27 million in Defense Production Act funding to expand domestic antimony mining and processing. The Defense Logistics Agency separately awarded a contract of up to $245 million to replenish the national stockpile with antimony ingots. When the buyer of last resort is the Pentagon and it is actively writing checks to build domestic supply, the strategic value of a large, well-located U.S. resource is hard to overstate.

That is the backdrop against which NevGold Corp., a Vancouver-based explorer, reported a milestone. On July 15, 2026, the company published a maiden gold-antimony mineral resource estimate for its Limo Butte project in Nevada. The estimate includes 29,600 tonnes of antimony in the measured-and-indicated categories at 0.26% grade, plus 48,100 tonnes inferred at 0.18% grade. CEO Brandon Bonifacio described it as one of the largest, most strategic antimony-gold resources in the United States. The company said the deposit is a near-surface oxide mineralization amenable to leaching, with potential to produce antimony metal at the project site and remove reliance on downstream refining. The company has pointed to a path toward near-term antimony production from historical leach pads, potentially by 2027, while it continues to expand the deposit. As with any exploration-stage project, these are objectives rather than producing operations. Significant work, permitting, and financing remain before any production decision.

What would reduce the risk? If the three proposed smelters are completed on schedule, if NevGold or other projects advance to production, and if China extends the suspension beyond November 2026. What would make it worse? Delays in smelter construction, a resumption of full export prohibitions by China, or further acceleration of military demand that tightens the market even before the deficit is resolved.

Honeywell International Inc. (HON) and RTX Corporation (RTX) are among the large defense and industrial firms whose supply chains depend on stable antimony access. Their demand for specialty materials underscores the strategic importance of domestic processing capacity. AlphaScala's proprietary score for HON stands at 51, reflecting a mixed outlook, while RTX scores 58, a moderate signal.

The next concrete date to watch is November 27, 2026, when the suspension of China's antimony export prohibition to the United States expires. Whether Beijing extends it, modifies it, or lets it lapse will determine the trajectory of pricing and the urgency of domestic supply development.